![]() For example, the idea of a triangle is the mode of thought which represents the triangle. What is called an idea, in the sense in which everyone has always taken it in the history of philosophy, is a mode of thought which represents something. Some translators translate affectio as “affection” and affectus as “feeling”, which is better than translating both by the same word, but I don't see the necessity of having recourse to the word “feeling” since French offers the word “affect.” Thus when I use the word “affect” it refers to Spinoza's affectus, and when I say the word “affection,” it refers to affectio.įirst point: what is an idea? What must an idea be, in order for us to comprehend even Spinoza's simplest propositions? On this point Spinoza is not original, he is going to take the word “idea” in the sense in which everyone has always taken it. They translate both terms, affectio and affectus, by “affection.” I call this a disaster because when a philosopher employs two words, it's because in principle he has reason to, especially when French easily gives us two words which correspond rigorously to affectio and affectus, that is “affection” for affectio and “affect” for affectus. Some translators, quite strangely, translate both in the same way. ![]() In Spinoza's principal book, which is called the Ethics and which is written in Latin, one finds two words: AFFECTIO and AFFECTUS. I begin with some terminological cautions. It matters little whether you've read him or not, for I'm telling a story. I believe that, of all the philosophers of whom the history of philosophy speaks to us, Spinoza is in a quite exceptional situation: the way he touches those who enter into his books has no equivalent. I assume that the room is relatively mixed. I will begin chiefly with terminological remarks. After all, a philosopher is not only someone who invents notions, he also perhaps invents ways of perceiving. ![]() I would almost like for you to take this bit of history of philosophy as a history tout court. During March, at the request of some of you, we will also take a break to consider the problem of synthesis and the problem of time in Kant.įor me, this produces a curious effect of returning to history. This very precise point concerns the following: what is an idea and what is an affect in Spinoza? Idea and affect in Spinoza. It's like a break, at the request of some of you. Overall, I argue that the adequate knowledge of emotions provided by reason lies at the core of Spinoza’s project of formulating guidelines for the attainment of human flourishing, that is, freedom.Today we pause in our work on continuous variation to return temporarily, for one session, to the history of philosophy, on a very precise point. At the same time, the ethical insight consists in the adequate understanding of what counts with certainty as increasing an individual’s power of acting as deriving from the metaphysical understanding of the affection of one’s conatus. The metaphysical insight stems from an adequate understanding of the directionality of individual desires which knowledge of the emotions provides in terms of self-knowledge. In particular, I argue that adequate knowledge of the emotions attained through reason provides human beings with a twofold insight on the one hand, adequate knowledge of affectus provides metaphysical insight while, on the other hand, it provides ethical insight. Summary/Abstract: In this paper, I argue that Spinoza’s theory of emotions as developed in his Ethics provides a theory of becoming. Published by: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti Keywords: Spinoza emotions reason self-knowledge moral knowledge ![]() Subject(s): Philosophy, Ethics / Practical Philosophy Maps of Becoming: Emotions and Reason in Spinoza’s Ethics Author(s): Alice Simionato Maps of Becoming: Emotions and Reason in Spinoza’s Ethics ![]()
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